what is the problem of religious language and how did erigena attempt to solve it?

Philosophical problem of how to talk virtually God

The problem of religious language considers whether it is possible to talk nearly God meaningfully if the traditional conceptions of God as existence incorporeal, infinite, and timeless, are accepted. Because these traditional conceptions of God make information technology difficult to describe God, religious linguistic communication has the potential to be meaningless. Theories of religious language either endeavor to demonstrate that such language is meaningless, or attempt to prove how religious language can nonetheless be meaningful.

Traditionally, religious language has been explained every bit via negativa, illustration, symbolism, or myth, each of which describes a manner of talking about God in homo terms. The via negativa is a manner of referring to God according to what God is not; analogy uses human qualities as standards against which to compare divine qualities; symbolism is used not-literally to describe otherwise ineffable experiences; and a mythological interpretation of religion attempts to reveal fundamental truths behind religious stories. Alternative explanations of religious linguistic communication cast it as having political, performative, or imperative functions.

Empiricist David Hume'due south requirement that claims about reality must be verified past evidence influenced the logical positivist movement, particularly the philosopher A. J. Ayer. The motility proposed that, for a argument to hold meaning, it must be possible to verify its truthfulness empirically – with evidence from the senses. Consequently, the logical positivists argued that religious language must be meaningless because the propositions it makes are impossible to verify. Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein has been regarded every bit a logical positivist by some academics considering he distinguished between things that can and cannot be spoken about; others have argued that he could not accept been a logical positivist because he emphasised the importance of mysticism. British philosopher Antony Flew proposed a similar challenge based on the principle that, in so far as assertions of religious conventionalities cannot be empirically falsified, religious statements are rendered meaningless.

The analogy of games – most usually associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein – has been proposed as a style of establishing significant in religious linguistic communication. The theory asserts that linguistic communication must be understood in terms of a game: just equally each game has its own rules determining what tin and cannot be washed, then each context of language has its own rules determining what is and is not meaningful. Religion is classified every bit a possible and legitimate language game which is meaningful within its own context. Diverse parables have too been proposed to solve the trouble of meaning in religious language. R. M. Hare used his parable of a lunatic to introduce the concept of "bliks" – unfalsifiable beliefs according to which a worldview is established – which are not necessarily meaningless. Basil Mitchell used a parable to prove that faith tin be logical, even if it seems unverifiable. John Hick used his parable of the Celestial Metropolis to propose his theory of eschatological verification, the view that if there is an afterlife, then religious statements will be verifiable after death.

Problem of religious language [edit]

Religious linguistic communication is a philosophical problem arising from the difficulties in accurately describing God. Because God is by and large conceived as incorporeal, infinite, and timeless, ordinary language cannot always use to that entity.^[1] This makes speaking about or attributing properties to God hard: a religious laic might simultaneously wish to describe God equally skilful, yet also hold that God'southward goodness is unique and cannot exist articulated past homo linguistic communication of goodness. This raises the problem of how (and whether) God tin can be meaningfully spoken about at all,^[2] which causes problems for religious belief since the ability to describe and talk about God is important in religious life.^[three] The French philosopher Simone Weil expressed this problem in her piece of work Waiting for God, in which she outlined her dilemma: she was simultaneously certain of God's love and conscious that she could not adequately depict him.^[four]

The medieval doctrine of divine simplicity also poses problems for religious language. This suggests that God has no adventitious backdrop – these are properties that a being tin have which do not contribute to its essence. If God has no accidental properties, he cannot be as he is traditionally conceived, considering properties such every bit goodness are accidental. If divine simplicity is accustomed, so to draw God as skillful would entail that goodness and God have the same definition.^[1] Such limits can besides exist problematic to religious believers; for example, the Bible regularly ascribes different emotions to God, ascriptions which would be implausible according to the doctrine of divine simplicity.^[5]

The theologian Sallie McFague believes that the more recent problem of religious language is based on individual feel, owing to the increased secularisation of society. She notes that human feel is of this world rather than regular encounters with the divine, which makes the experience of God uncommon and potentially unnecessary. Because of this, she argues, religious language is both idolatrous considering it fails to express sufficient awe of God, and irrelevant because without adequate words it becomes meaningless.^[6]

Classical understanding of religious language [edit]

Via negativa [edit]

18th-century depiction of Maimonides, who adult the via negativa

Jewish philosopher Maimonides believed that God can only exist ascribed negative attributes, a view based on two key Jewish beliefs: that the existence of God must exist accustomed, and that information technology is forbidden to describe God.^[vii] Maimonides believed that God is uncomplicated and then cannot be ascribed whatever essential attributes.^[viii] He therefore argued that statements well-nigh God must be taken negatively, for example, "God lives" should be taken as "God does not lack vitality".^[9] Maimonides did not believe that God holds all of his attributes perfectly and without harm; rather, he proposed that God lies outside of any homo measures. To say that God is powerful, for example, would mean that God's ability is beyond worldly ability, and incomparable to any other power. In doing and so, Maimonides attempted to illustrate God's indescribable nature and draw attending to the linguistic limits of describing God.^[10]

Critics maintain that such kind of solution severely limits the caste to which what can be spoken about God.^[i]

Analogy and metaphor [edit]

Thomas Aquinas argued that statements virtually God are coordinating to man experience because of the causal relationship between God and creatures.^[1] An analogous term is partly univocal (has simply one significant) and partly equivocal (has more than 1 potential meaning) because an analogy is in some means the same and in some ways dissimilar from the field of study.^[eleven] He proposed that those godly qualities which resemble human qualities are described analogously, with reference to human terms; for example, when God is described as skillful, it does non mean that God is skillful in man terms, only that human goodness is used as a reference to describe God'due south goodness.^[1]

Philosopher Taede Smedes argued that religious language is symbolic.^[12] Denying any conflict between science and religion, he proposes that 'to believe' means to accept a conviction (that God exists, in the context of Christianity), which is dissimilar from 'knowing', which only occurs in one case something is proven. Thus, according to Smedes, we believe things that we practise not know for sure.^[13] Smedes argues that, rather than existence part of the world, God is so far beyond the globe that in that location tin be no mutual standard to which both God and the earth can be compared.^[14] He argues that people tin yet believe in God, even though he cannot be compared to anything in the world, considering belief in God is just an alternative way of viewing that world (he likens this to two people viewing a painting differently).^[xv] Smedes claims that there should be no reason to look for a meaning behind our metaphors and symbols of God considering the metaphors are all nosotros have of God. He suggests that we tin simply talk of God pro nobis (for us) and non in se (as such) or sine nobis (without us). The signal, he argues, is not that our concept of God should correspond with reality, but that we can but excogitate of God through metaphors.^[12]

In the twentieth century, Ian Ramsey developed the theory of analogy, a evolution later cited in numerous works by Alister McGrath. He argued that various models of God are provided in religious writings that interact with each other: a range of analogies for salvation and the nature of God. Ramsey proposed that the models used alter and qualify each other, defining the limits of other analogies. As a outcome, no one analogy on its own is sufficient, but the combination of every illustration presented in Scripture gives a full and consistent depiction of God.^[sixteen] The use of other analogies may then be used to decide if any i model of God is driveling or improperly practical.^[17]

Information technology is proposed that analogy is also present in everyday discourses. For example, when a speaker uses the word foursquare, the speakers may well use it to refer to an object that is approximately square rather than a genuine foursquare.^[xviii]

Critics debate that metaphor theories are unsatisfactory considering metaphors are always in principle susceptible to literal paraphrase.^[18]

Symbolism [edit]

Sikh religious text, the Sri Guru Granth Sahib Nishan, in which religious language is used symbolically

Philosopher Paul Tillich argued that religious faith is best expressed through symbolism because a symbol points to a significant beyond itself and all-time expresses transcendent religious beliefs. He believed that any statement about God is symbolic and participates in the meaning of a concept.^[nineteen] Tillich used the case of a national flag to illustrate his point: a flag points to something beyond itself, the land it represents, but also participates in the meaning of the country. He believed that symbols could unite a religious believer with a deeper dimension of himself every bit well as with a greater reality.^[twenty] Tillich believed that symbols must emerge from an private commonage unconsciousness, and can only function when they are accepted past the unconscious. He believed that symbols cannot be invented, just alive and die at the appropriate times.^[21]

Louis Dupré differentiates between signs and symbols, proposing that a sign points to something while a symbol represents it. A symbol holds its ain significant: rather than just pointing someone towards another object, it takes the identify of and represents that object. He believes that a symbol has some ambiguity which does not exist with a sign.^[22] Dupré believes that a symbol may deserve respect considering information technology contains what is signified within itself.^[23] A symbol reveals a reality beyond what is already perceived and transforms the ways the current reality is perceived.^[24] Dupré differentiates betwixt religious and aesthetic symbols, suggesting that a religious symbol points towards something which "remains forever beyond our reach". He proposed that a religious symbol does non reveal the nature of what it signifies, just conceals it.^[25]

Langdon Brown Gilkey explained religious linguistic communication and feel in terms of symbolism, identifying three characteristic features of religious symbolism which distinguish it from other language apply. Firstly, religious symbolism has a double focus, referring both to something empirical and to something transcendent; Gilkey argued that the empirical manifestation points towards the transcendent being. Secondly, he believed that religious symbolism concerns central questions of life, involving issues of import to an private or community. Finally, he argued that religious symbols provide standards past which life should exist lived.^[26]

In the Sikh religious text the Guru Granth Sahib, religious linguistic communication is used symbolically and metaphorically. In the text, Sikh Gurus echo that the experiences they accept while meditating are ineffable, incognizable, incomprehensible, and transensuous – this means that there is no object of their experience that can be conceptualised.^[27] To overcome this, the Sikh Gurus used symbolic and metaphorical linguistic communication, assuming that there is a resemblance between the mystical experience of the divine (the sabad) and those experiencing it. For case, light is used to refer to the spiritual reality.^[28]

Myth [edit]

William Paden argued that religious language uses myth to present truths through stories. He argued that to those who practice a religion, myths are non mere fiction, but provide religious truths. Paden believed that a myth must explain something in the world with reference to a sacred being or strength, and dismissed any myths which did not as "folktales".^[29] Using the instance of creation myths, he differentiated myths from scientific hypotheses, the latter of which can be scientifically verified and do not reveal a greater truth; a myth cannot be analysed in the same mode equally a scientific theory.^[29]

Lutheran theologian Rudolf Bultmann proposed that the Bible contains existential content which is expressed through mythology; Bultmann sought to notice the existential truths backside the veil of mythology, a job known every bit 'demythologising'.^[thirty] Bultmann distinguished between informative language and language with personal import, the latter of which commands obedience. He believed that God interacts with humans as the divine Discussion, perceiving a linguistic character inherent in God, which seeks to provide humans with self-understanding.^[31] Bultmann believed that the cultural embeddedness of the Bible could be overcome by demythologising the Bible, a process which he believed would allow readers to better encounter the discussion of God.^[32]

Christian philosopher John Hick believed that the linguistic communication of the Bible should exist demythologised to be uniform with naturalism. He offered a demythologised Christology, arguing that Jesus was not God incarnate, but a man with incredible experience of divine reality. To Hick, calling Jesus the Son of God was a metaphor used by Jesus' followers to depict their delivery to what Jesus represented.^[33] Hick believed that demythologising the incarnation would brand sense of the variety of world religions and give them equal validity equally ways to encounter God.^[34]

Alternative explanations of religious linguistic communication [edit]

Political [edit]

Islamic philosopher Carl Ernst has argued that religious language is oft political, especially in the public sphere, and that its purpose is to persuade people and establish dominance, as well as convey information. He explains that the modern criticisms of the West fabricated by some sections of Islam are an ideological reaction to colonialism, which intentionally uses the same language equally colonialists.^[35] Ernst argues that when it is used rhetorically, religious language cannot be taken at face value considering of its political implications.^[36]

Performative [edit]

Peter Donovan argues that near religious language is not nigh making truth-claims; instead, it is used to accomplish sure goals.^[37] He notes that language tin be used in culling ways across making statements of fact, such as expressing feelings or asking questions. Donovan calls many of these uses performative, as they serve to perform a certain part within religious life. For example, the words "I promise" perform the action of promising themselves – Donovan argues that most religious language fulfils this function.^[38] Ludwig Wittgenstein also proposed that linguistic communication could be performative and presented a list of the different uses of language. Wittgenstein argued that "the significant of the linguistic communication is in the use", taking the use of language to be performative.^[39] The philosopher J. Fifty. Austin argued that religious language is not just cognitive but can perform social acts, including vows, blessings, and the naming of children.^[xl] He distinguished performative statements as those that practise non simply describe a land of affairs, but bring them about.^[41] Historian of faith Benjamin Ray uses the operation of rituals within religions as evidence for a performative interpretation of language. He argues that the linguistic communication of rituals can perform social tasks: when a priest announces that a spiritual issue has occurred, those present believe it because of the spiritual authority of the priest. He believed that the pregnant of a ritual is defined by the language used by the speaker, who is defined culturally as a superhuman agent.^[42]

Imperative [edit]

British philosopher R. B. Braithwaite attempted to approach religious linguistic communication empirically and adopted Wittgenstein's idea of "meaning as apply".^[43] He likened religious statements to moral statements because they are both non-descriptive yet even so accept a utilize and a meaning; they do not describe the globe, but the believer's attitudes towards it. Braithwaite believed that the main difference between a religious and a moral statement was that religious statements are role of a linguistic system of stories, metaphors, and parables.^[44]

Professor Nathan Katz writes of the analogy of a burning building, used past the Buddha in the Lotus Sutra, which casts religious linguistic communication as imperative. In the analogy, a begetter sees his children at the top of a called-for building. He persuades them to leave, just simply by promising them toys if they leave. Katz argues that the message of the parable is not that the Buddha has been telling lies; rather, he believes that the Buddha was illustrating the imperative utilize of language. Katz believes that religious language is an imperative and an invitation, rather than a truth-claim.^[45]

Challenges to religious linguistic communication [edit]

David Hume [edit]

In the conclusion of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Scottish philosopher David Hume argued that statements that make claims about reality must be verified by feel, and dismissed those that cannot be verified as meaningless. Hume regarded well-nigh religious language as unverifiable by experiment then dismissed it.^[46]

Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact of beingness? No. Commit it then to the flames: for information technology can comprise zero but sophistry and illusion.

—David Hume, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding ^[46]

Hume criticised the view that we cannot speak about God, and proposed that this view is no different from the skeptical view that God cannot exist spoken about. He was unconvinced by Aquinas' theory of analogy and argued that God's attributes must be completely dissimilar from man attributes, making comparisons between the two incommunicable. Hume's scepticism influenced the logical positivist motion of the twentieth century.^[47]

Logical positivism [edit]

The logical positivism movement originated in the Vienna Circumvolve and was connected by British philosopher A. J. Ayer. The Vienna Circle adopted the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements: analytic statements are those whose meaning is contained within the words themselves, such every bit definitions, tautologies or mathematical statements, while constructed statements make claims almost reality.^[48] To determine whether a constructed statement is meaningful, the Vienna Circle developed a verifiability theory of pregnant, which proposed that for a synthetic statement to have cognitive significant, its truthfulness must be empirically verifiable.^[49] Considering claims virtually God cannot be empirically verified, the logical positivists argued that religious propositions are meaningless.^[48]

In 1936, Ayer wrote Linguistic communication, Truth and Logic, in which he claimed that religious linguistic communication is meaningless.^[50] He put forward a strong empirical position, arguing that all noesis must either come from observations of the world or be necessarily true, similar mathematical statements.^[51] In doing so, he rejected metaphysics, which considers the reality of a world across the natural globe and science. Because it is based on metaphysics and is therefore unverifiable, Ayer denounced religious linguistic communication, as well as statements about ethics or aesthetics, every bit meaningless.^[52] Ayer challenged the meaningfulness of all statements about God – theistic, atheistic and doubter – arguing that they are all every bit meaningless because they all discuss the existence of a metaphysical, unverifiable being.^[48]

Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein finished his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus with the proposition that "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof i must be silent." Beverly and Brian Clack accept suggested that because of this statement, Wittgenstein was taken for a positivist by many of his disciples because he made a distinction betwixt what tin can and cannot be spoken virtually. They argue that this interpretation is inaccurate because Wittgenstein held the mystical, which cannot be described, equally important.^[53] Rather than dismissing the mystical as meaningless, as the logical positivists did, Wittgenstein believed that while the facts of the globe remain the same, the perspective from which they are viewed will vary.^[54]

Falsification [edit]

The falsification principle has been adult as an alternative theory past which it may be possible to distinguish between those religious statements that may potentially have significant, and those that are meaningless. It proposes that nearly religious language is unfalsifiable because there is no mode that information technology could exist empirically proven faux. In a landmark paper published in 1945, analytic philosopher Antony Flew argued that a meaningful argument must simultaneously assert and deny a situation; for example, the statement "God loves u.s.a." both asserts that God loves us and denies that God does non dearest the states. Flew maintained that if a religious believer could not say what circumstances would take to exist for their statements about God to be false, then they are unfalsifiable and meaningless.^[51]

Using John Wisdom'due south parable of the invisible gardener, Flew attempted to demonstrate that religious linguistic communication is unfalsifiable. The parable tells the story of 2 people who find a garden on a deserted island; i believes it is tended to past a gardener, the other believes that it formed naturally, without the existence of a gardener. The two watch out for the gardener but never find him; the non-believer consequently maintains that in that location is no gardener, whereas the believer rationalises the non-advent by suggesting that the gardener is invisible and cannot be detected.^[55] Flew contended that if the believer'southward interpretation is accepted, zip is left of the original gardener. He argued that religious believers tend to adopt counterpart rationalisations in response to any apparent challenge to their behavior from empirical evidence; and these beliefs consequently suffer a "expiry by a thousand qualifications" as they are qualified and modified and so much that they finish up asserting nothing meaningful.^[56] Flew applied his principles to religious claims such as God's beloved for humans, arguing that if they are meaningful assertions they would deny a certain situation. He argued that when faced with show against the existence of a loving God, such equally the terminal illness of a child, theists volition qualify their claims to permit for such evidence; for example they may suggest that God's love is different from human beloved. Such qualifications, Flew argued, make the original proposition meaningless; he questioned what God's love really promises and what it guarantees against, and proposed that God'southward qualified honey promises nothing and becomes worthless.^[57]

Flew continued in many subsequent publications to maintain the falsifiability benchmark for meaning; but in later life retracted the specific assertion in his 1945 paper that all religious linguistic communication is unfalsifiable, and so meaningless. Drawing specifically on the emerging science of molecular genetics (which had not existed at the time of his original paper), Flew eventually became convinced that the complexity this revealed in the mechanisms of biological reproduction might not be consistent with the time known to accept been available for evolution on Earth to accept happened; and that this potentially suggested a valid empirical exam by which the assertion "that there is no creator God" might be falsified; "the latest work I have seen shows that the present physical universe gives as well trivial time for these theories of abiogenesis to get the job done."^[58]

Analogies of games [edit]

The analogy of a game was first proposed by Hans-Georg Gadamer in an attempt to demonstrate the epistemic unity of linguistic communication. He suggested that language is like a game which anybody participates in and is played past a greater being.^[59] Gadamer believed that language makes upwards the fundamental structure of reality and that human language participates in a greater language; Christianity teaches this to be the divine word which created the world and was incarnate in Jesus Christ.^[60]

Ludwig Wittgenstein proposed a calculus theory of linguistic communication, which maintained that all language should be analysable in a compatible fashion. Later on in his life he rejected this theory, and instead proposed an culling language-game analogy.^[61] He likened the differences in languages to the differences in games, arguing that just as there are many different games, each with different rules, and then at that place are many unlike kinds of language.^[62] Wittgenstein argued that different forms of linguistic communication have different rules which determine what makes a proffer meaningful; outside of its language-game, a proposition is meaningless. He believed that the meaning of a proposition depends on its context and the rules of that context.^[63] Wittgenstein presented a linguistic communication game equally a situation in which sure kinds of language are used. He provided some examples of linguistic communication games: "Asking, thanking, greeting, blasphemous, praying".^[64]

It is as if someone were to say: 'A game consists of moving objects almost on a surface according to sure rules...' – and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board games, but at that place are others.

Wittgenstein believed that religion is significant because it offers a particular way of life, rather than confirming the beingness of God. He therefore believed that religious language is confessional – a confession of what someone feels and believes – rather than consisting of claims to truth. Wittgenstein believed that religious language is dissimilar from language used to describe physical objects because it occupies a different language game.^[65]

Dewi Zephaniah Phillips dedicated Wittgenstein's theory by arguing that although religious language games are autonomous, they should non be treated as isolated because they make statements about secular events such equally nascency and death. Phillips argued that considering of this connection, religions can still exist criticised based on human being experiences of these secular events. He maintained that religion cannot be denounced equally incorrect because information technology is not empirical.^[66]

Peter Donovan criticises the language-games arroyo for failing to recognise that religions operate in a earth containing other ideas and that many religious people brand claims to truth. He notes that many religious believers non only believe their religion to be meaningful and true in its own context, but merits that information technology is truthful against all other possible beliefs; if the linguistic communication games analogy is accustomed, such a comparison betwixt beliefs is impossible.^[67] Donovan proposes that debates between unlike religions, and the apologetics of some, demonstrates that they interact with each other and the wider world and so cannot exist treated as isolated language games.^[68]

Parables [edit]

R. M. Hare [edit]

In response to Flew's falsification principle, British philosopher R. M. Hare told a parable in an attempt to demonstrate that religious language is meaningful. Hare described a lunatic who believes that all university professors want to kill him; no amount of testify of kindly professors will dissuade him from this view. Hare called this kind of unfalsifiable confidence a "blik", and argued that it formed an unfalsifiable, withal still meaningful, worldview. He proposed that all people – religious and non-religious – hold bliks, and that they cannot exist unseated by empirical evidence. Nevertheless, he maintained that a blik is meaningful considering it forms the basis of a person's understanding of the world.^[69] Hare believed that some bliks are correct and others are non, though he did non suggest a method of distinguishing betwixt the two.^[70]

Basil Mitchell [edit]

Basil Mitchell responded to Flew'due south falsification principle with his own parable. He described an underground resistance soldier who meets a stranger who claims to exist leading the resistance movement. The stranger tells the soldier to keep organized religion in him, even if he is seen to be fighting for the other side. The soldier'south faith is regularly tested as he observes the stranger fighting for both sides, merely his religion remains strong.^[71] Mitchell's parable teaches that although testify tin can claiming a religious conventionalities, a believer still has reason to hold their views.^[72] He argued that although a believer volition not allow annihilation to count decisively against his beliefs, the theist still accepts the existence of prove which could count against religious conventionalities.^[73]

John Hick [edit]

Responding to the verification principle, John Hick used his parable of the Celestial Urban center to describe his theory of eschatological verificationism. His parable is of 2 travellers, a theist and an atheist, together on a road. The theist believes that in that location is a Celestial City at the cease of the route; the atheist believes that there is no such city. Hick's parable is an allegory of the Christian belief in an afterlife, which he argued can exist verified upon death.^[74] Hick believed that eschatological verification is "unsymmetrical" because while it could be verified if it is true, it cannot be falsified if not. This is in contrast to ordinary "symmetrical" statements, which can be verified or falsified.^[75]

In his biography of Hick, David Cheetham notes a criticism of Hick's theory: waiting for eschatological verification could make religious belief conditional, preventing total commitment to faith.^[76] Cheetham argues that such criticism is misapplied because Hick'southward theory was non directed to religious believers just to philosophers, who argued that religion is unverifiable and therefore meaningless.^[76]

James Morris notes that Hick'south eschatological verification theory has been criticised for being inconsistent with his belief in religious pluralism. Morris argues that such criticism can be overcome past modifying Hick'due south parable to include multiple travellers, all with different beliefs, on the road. He argues that even if some beliefs most life after death are unverifiable, Hick's conventionalities in bodily resurrection tin still be verified.^[73]

Run into also [edit]

• Theological noncognitivism
• Divine simplicity
• Apophatic theology
• Ineffability

Notes [edit]

1. ^ ^{a b c d e} Weed 2007.
2. ^ Davies 2004, p. 139–140.
3. ^ White 2010, p. 1.
4. ^ McFague 1982, p. i.
5. ^ White 2010, p. 1–2.
6. ^ McFague 1982, p. 1–2.
7. ^ Levin & Schweid 2008, p. 237.
8. ^ Hyman 2008, p. 400.
9. ^ Seeskin 2005, p. 88.
10. ^ Seeskin 2005, p. 89.
11. ^ Cahalan 1985, p. 438.
12. ^ ^{a b} Depoortere, van Erp & Boeve 2010, p. 44.
13. ^ Depoortere, van Erp & Boeve 2010, p. 41.
14. ^ Depoortere, van Erp & Boeve 2010, p. 43.
15. ^ Depoortere, van Erp & Boeve 2010, p. 45-46.
16. ^ McGrath 2011, ch. 13.
17. ^ McGrath 1998, p. 183.
18. ^ ^{a b} Scott 2017.
19. ^ Cooper 1997, p. 134.
20. ^ Dourley 1975, p. 85–six.
21. ^ Rees 2001, p. fourscore.
22. ^ Dupré 2000, p. 1.
23. ^ Dupré 2000, p. 1–2.
24. ^ Dupré 2000, p. 2.
25. ^ Dupré 2000, p. vi.
26. ^ Pasewark & Pool 1999, p. 103.
27. ^ Singh 1990, p. 185.
28. ^ Singh 1990, p. 186.
29. ^ ^{a b} Paden 1994, p. 73–74.
30. ^ Sherratt 2006, p. 81.
31. ^ Sherratt 2006, p. 82.
32. ^ Dray 2002, p. 259.
33. ^ Mbogu 2008, p. 117.
34. ^ Hebblethwaite 1987, p. 7.
35. ^ Ernst 2004, p. 8.
36. ^ Ernst 2004, p. 9.
37. ^ Donovan 1982, p. 78.
38. ^ Donovan 1982, p. 79–80.
39. ^ Robinson 2003, p. 29.
40. ^ Hoffman 2007, p. 26.
41. ^ Lawson & McCauley 1993, p. 51.
42. ^ Lawson & McCauley 1993, p. 51–2.
43. ^ Harris 2002, p. 49.
44. ^ Tracy 1996, p. 121.
45. ^ Katz 1982, p. 232.
46. ^ ^{a b} Ballyhoo & Clack 2008, p. 98.
47. ^ Jones 2006, p. 171–2.
48. ^ ^{a b c} Evans 1985, p. 142.
49. ^ Weinberg 2001, p. 1.
50. ^ Attfield 2006, p. 11.
51. ^ ^{a b} Tracy 1996, p. 120.
52. ^ Oppy & Scott 2010, p. 8.
53. ^ Clack & Clack 1998, p. 110.
54. ^ Clack & Ballyhoo 1998, p. 111.
55. ^ Lumsden 2009, p. 44.
56. ^ Jones 2006, p. 172.
57. ^ Allen 1992, p. 283–284.
58. ^ Flew 2007, p. 124.
59. ^ Horn 2005, p. 111.
60. ^ Cooper 2006, p. 217–218.
61. ^ Labron 2006, p. 28.
62. ^ ^{a b} Horn 2005, p. 112.
63. ^ Glock 1996, p. 192–193.
64. ^ Brenner 1999, p. 16.
65. ^ Clack 1999, p. 79.
66. ^ Lacewing & Pascal 2007, p. 173–4.
67. ^ Donovan 1982, p. 93.
68. ^ Donovan 1982, p. 94–95.
69. ^ Jones 2006, p. 173.
70. ^ Harris 2002, p. 37–38.
71. ^ Clarke 2001, p. 148.
72. ^ Griffiths & Taliaferro 2003, p. 108–109.
73. ^ ^{a b} Harris 2002, p. 64.
74. ^ Polkinghorne 2003, p. 145–146.
75. ^ Cheetham 2003, p. 39.
76. ^ ^{a b} Cheetham 2003, p. 30.

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External links [edit]

• Problem of religious linguistic communication at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
• Problem of religious language at PhilPapers
• "Problem of religious language". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_religious_language

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